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Abstract
In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals act as reference
points in shaping the valuation of outcomes. Theories of reference-dependent preferences, such
as Prospect Theory, imply that outcomes that are just below or just above a reference point are
evaluated differently. Consistent with the Prospect Theory value function, we find that satis-
faction as a function of relative performance (the difference between a runner’s finishing time
goal and her actual finishing time) exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in both
predictions of and actual experienced satisfaction. However, in contrast to Prospect Theory, we
observe that loss aversion is partially driven by a discontinuity or jump at the reference point.
In addition, we find that a runner’s time goal as well as their previous marathon times simulta-
neously impact runner satisfaction, providing support for the impact of multiple reference points
on satisfaction.
Keywords reference dependence, Prospect Theory, loss aversion, goals, satisfaction
JEL Classifications C93 D03
1 Introduction
A recent article in The Chronicle of Higher Education documented the enormous scholarly impact
of Prospect Theory in economics, psychology, and beyond (Goldstein 2011). Perhaps the main
reason Prospect Theory has been so influential is the theory’s proposition that individuals evaluate
outcomes in relative terms, as changes from a neutral reference point rather than final states as
classical economic models assume (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
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Indeed, reference-dependent preferences account for a wide range of empirical phenomena, including
the endowment effect (Kahneman et al. 1990), status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988),
disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985), equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995),
and extreme risk aversion for prospects involving the possibility of a loss (Kahneman and Lovallo
1993; Rabin 2000).
Empirical investigations of Prospect Theory and reference dependence have largely taken the
reference point to be the status quo.1 In many domains, this choice is sensible because the status
quo is the most reasonable or even the only reasonable reference point from which to evaluate
a particular outcome. However, in other settings, points of comparison besides the status quo
are plausible reference points, such as “aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons”
(Tversky and Kahneman 1991). While these alternative reference points have been the subject
of some empirical study, such investigations face conceptual and methodological challenges. Con-
ceptually, the field currently lacks the principles to guide a researcher challenged with identifying
which of any number of plausible reference points is used to evaluate an outcome. For example, the
reference point for selling a house might be the purchase price, an offer that was recently turned
down, the sales price of a neighbor’s property, a round number such as $500,000, or the average
sales price of comparable houses. Empirically, even if the researcher knows which type of reference
point drives evaluation, the level of that reference point may be difficult to observe and measure.
Expectations, for example, are generally subjective and thus hidden from the researcher.
In this paper, we investigate reference dependence in marathon running.2 Although this setting
is distinct from those traditionally used to study Prospect Theory, we argue that it provides useful
and unique insights into how non-status quo reference points operate. While people run marathons
for a variety of reasons (e.g., to finish a long race or to support a charity), surpassing a predetermined
time goal defines success for many marathoners. Indeed, marathon training guides often emphasize
the importance of time goals as a motivational tool and provide heuristics and calculators for setting
appropriate goals (e.g., Higdon 2011). In the present research, we test the specific proposition that
1Although we use reference-dependent preferences and Prospect Theory interchangeably, our investigation only
considers the distortion of outcomes, not the nonlinear treatment of probabilities modeled by Prospect Theory (e.g.,
Wu and Gonzalez 1996; Prelec 1998).
2Some recent papers have used a combination of archival and survey data of marathoners to study the effect of
round numbers on performance (Allen et al., 2017), optimism on performance (Krawcyzk and Wilamowski, 2017)
and the relationship between performance and goal attainability (Burdina, Hiller, and Metz, 2017).
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time goals serve as reference points in the evaluation of marathon performance.3 In support of this
proposition, we find that satisfaction as a function of performance relative to the time goal exhibits
loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, mirroring the classic S-shape of the Prospect Theory value
function. However, we also document a jump in satisfaction at the reference point that departs
from Prospect Theory’s continuous value function. For marathon runners, aversion to losses thus
appears to have two sources: a value function that has a steeper slope in losses than in gains, as in
the classical Prospect Theory account, and a discrete jump at the reference point itself.
Our novel setting also yields a number of conceptual insights, filling gaps in the existing litera-
ture and generalizing the scope of Prospect Theory in several ways. First, we employ satisfaction
as our dependent measure instead of estimating the value function from choice percentages or cash
equivalents. While studies of overt behavior can speak to the role of reference dependence in the
determination of decision utility (the weight given to outcomes in choice), they cannot provide
insight into how, if at all, reference dependence shapes experienced utility (Kahneman 1999). In
our study, we examine both pre-marathon predictions of satisfaction and post-marathon measures
of satisfaction and find that loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity are present in both predicted
and experienced satisfaction, contrary to the results of Kermer et al. (2006).
We also examine the role of multiple reference points. In our context, a time goal is one
of several possible reference points runners may use to evaluate their performance. Experienced
marathoners, for instance, may compare their current performance against their most recent or
best marathon time. Indeed, we find that satisfaction among experienced marathoners is driven
by comparing performance with both their time goal and previous marathon times. In sum, this
study contributes to multiple strands of research on reference dependence.
Empirically, our results add to a growing list of field demonstrations of Prospect Theory
(Camerer 2005, Camerer et al. 1997; Fryer et al. 2012; Genesove and Mayer 2001; Pope and
Schweitzer 2011; Post et al. 2008; see Allen et al., 2017, for a more extensive list). This body
of work suggests that reference dependence extends beyond small-stakes, stylized laboratory ex-
periments, contrary to the criticism of List (2003).4 Moreover, we provide an estimation of the
3The proposition that goals serve as reference points has broader implications. Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999)
proposed that goals also influence effort provision, an account supported by Sackett et al. (2015), Allen et al. (2017),
and Corgnet et al. (2015).
4In the Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3.9, we also present evidence that loss aversion is present
and of similar magnitude for both experienced and inexperienced marathoners, also contrary to List (2003).
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Prospect Theory value function using data collected outside of the laboratory. Although many
papers have estimated the Prospect Theory value function from laboratory data (e.g., Abdellaoui
2000; Ga¨chter et al. 2007; Ho and Zhang 2008; Wu and Markle 2008), few have done so using field
data (for exceptions, see Post et al. 2008; Tovar 2009).
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing literature and position
this paper’s contributions relative to that literature. In Section 3, we describe the methods for
our empirical investigation. In Section 4, we present the basic results of our study. In Section
5, we estimate the Prospect Theory value function to relate satisfaction to relative performance.
In Section 6, we discuss some alternative explanations for our results and present evidence that
casts doubt on these accounts. We conclude in Section 7, by summarizing our contributions and
discussing some implications and future directions for this research.5
2 Background
In this section, we review literature on properties of the Prospect Theory value function, non-
status quo reference points, the effect of multiple reference points on the valuation of outcomes,
and differences between loss aversion in predicted and experienced utility. In doing so, we position
the contributions of our investigation and suggest that our novel domain allows us to pose and
answer questions that are difficult to address in more traditional decision-making settings.
2.1 Properties of the Prospect Theory Value Function
Theories of reference dependence imply that losses and gains are psychologically distinct. Behav-
iorally, the distinct treatment of gains and losses is captured by (i) the dislike for actuarially fair
mixed gambles, such as a 50-50 chance to win or lose $1000; and (ii) the “reflection effect,” the
tendency toward risk aversion for gambles involving gains and toward risk seeking for gambles in-
volving losses. These two phenomena led Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to posit a value function
v(x) that exhibits discontinuities in the first and second derivative at the reference point. The
standard Prospect Theory value function is steeper for losses than gains and exhibits diminishing
sensitivity, or concavity for gains and convexity for losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) fit a
5Additional details and analyses are found in the Electronic supplementary material.
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value function to certainty equivalent data and provided empirical support for this S-shape.
Although the notion that “losses loom larger than gains” is intuitive, a precise definition of
loss aversion is not straightforward. The literature has proposed a number of definitions of loss
aversion, as well as corresponding indices (i.e., loss aversion coefficients) (Ko¨bberling and Wakker
2005). In particular, loss aversion has been formalized either in terms of a difference in gain and
loss levels (−v(−x) > v(x),∀x) or a difference in gain and loss slopes (v′(−x) > v′(x), ∀x).6 These
definitions lend themselves to summary measures of loss aversion, −v(−x)/v(x) and v′(−x)/v′(x),
and in turn reflect two behavioral propositions. In Prospect Theory, loss aversion in levels holds
if an individual rejects all 50-50 symmetric gambles, whereas loss aversion in slopes holds if an
individual prefers a 50-50 symmetric gamble to the same gamble with a mean-preserving spread.7
These two formulations are equivalent for a value function that is continuous at the reference
point and exhibits symmetric curvature in gains and losses. However, a dislike of all symmetric
gambles does not require loss aversion in slopes and could instead arise from other instantiations
of reference dependence, such as a discontinuity or jump at the reference point as proposed by
Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008). Similarly, a jump at the reference point does not imply an
aversion to mean-preserving spreads captured by loss aversion in slopes. A discontinuous function
thus distinguishes between loss aversion at the reference point and loss aversion away from the
reference point.
We suggest that there is a parallel between the two behavioral propositions for mixed gambles
and propositions about the motivating effect of goals. Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) suggested that
a goal is motivating because it acts as a reference point. They asked participants for predictions
of which of two tired individuals was more likely to do one and only one additional sit-up, varying
goal levels as well as the number of sit-ups performed. When a goal is 30, it is intuitive that
a person who has performed 29 sit-ups will be more motivated than someone who has already
achieved 30 sit-ups. Such a difference in motivation reflects loss aversion at the reference point.
However, Heath, Larrick, and Wu also found that a person who had performed 25 sit-ups was more
motivated to do one more sit-up than someone who had performed 34 sit-ups, behavior consistent
with loss aversion away from the reference point.
6Throughout, we assume that v(0) = 0.
7For rhetorical simplicity, we ignore the complication of a nonlinear probability weighting function (see Schmidt
and Zank 2005).
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These two examples provide support for two behavioral propositions about the motivating
effect of goals on effort provision, at and away from the goal. In this paper, we investigate related
propositions on the effect of goals on satisfaction. Loss aversion at a goal means that a one minute
improvement in performance increases the satisfaction more for a runner who otherwise would have
fallen one minute short of her goal than a runner who otherwise would have just achieved her goal,
i.e., v(0) − v(−1) > v(1) − v(0). Similarly, loss aversion away from a goal implies that the same
improvement is more satisfying for a runner who is five minutes short of her goal than a runner
who is four minutes ahead of her goal, i.e., v(−4)− v(−5) > v(5)− v(4).
2.2 Non-Status Quo Reference Points
While studies of reference dependence have traditionally taken the reference point to be the status
quo, an increasing number have examined alternative reference points. In studies of the disposition
effect, for example, an asset’s initial purchase price serves as the reference point from which later
prices are evaluated. Consistent with that interpretation, investors are significantly more likely
to sell winning stocks than losing stocks (Barberis and Xiong 2009; Genesove and Mayer 2001;
Odean 1998; Shefrin and Statman 1985). Relatedly, Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) found that
the yearly high price operates as the reference point in the evaluation of employee stock options,
documenting a dramatic increase in the likelihood of exercising those options once the stock’s price
exceeded the yearly high.
Other studies have investigated contracts (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2011; Hart and Moore
2008), fair wages and bonuses (Mas 2006; Ockenfels et al. 2014), and round numbers (Allen et al.
2017; Pope and Simonsohn 2011) as reference points. A great deal of research has investigated
the role of expectations as reference points based on the theoretical models of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007) (cf. Abeler et al. 2011; Bartling, Brandes, and Schunk 2015; Ericson and Fuster 2011;
Pope and Schweitzer 2011).
Goals, aspirations, and targets are natural candidates for reference points and have been incor-
porated into a number of theoretical choice models (Diecidue and Van De Ven 2008; Lopes 1987;
Lopes and Oden 1999; March and Shapira 1992). In the literature on motivation, setting a goal is
a “discrepancy creating process” that produces “discontent with one’s present condition and the
desire to attain an object or outcome” (Locke and Latham 2006). Implicit in this formulation is
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the notion that goals operate as reference points, providing a point of comparison from which to
evaluate present performance.
In a series of laboratory studies, Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) demonstrated that charac-
teristics of the Prospect Theory value function could explain both effort and satisfaction in goal
pursuit tasks. Camerer et al. (1997) found that New York City taxi drivers work longer hours
on slower days (when the hourly wages are lower) and finish work earlier on busier days (when
hourly wages are higher). They proposed that drivers establish daily income targets and compare
their accumulated earnings against this standard. Earnings below a target is judged to be a loss,
leading drivers to exert additional effort to meet their targets. Fehr and Goette (2007), Crawford
and Meng (2011), Farber (2008), and Oettinger (1999) offered further support that income targets
act as reference points, although Farber (2005) provided conflicting evidence.
The aforementioned studies highlight how non-status quo reference points can be used to pro-
vide unique insights into many important economic and non-economic phenomena. Nevertheless,
there are conceptual and methodological challenges to studying non-status quo reference points.
Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) proposed that “whenever a specific point of comparison is psy-
chologically salient, it will serve as a reference point.” However, the literature has provided few
guiding principles to help researchers discriminate between any number of salient candidate refer-
ence points. Indeed, Barberis (2013) suggested that identifying the appropriate reference point is
one of the main challenges to applying Prospect Theory in field settings: “It is often unclear how to
define precisely what a gain or loss is, not least because Kahneman and Tversky offered relatively
little guidance on how the reference point is determined” (p. 178).
The difficulties extend beyond conceptual determination to measurement. While historical stock
prices are readily observable and round numbers are generally round for everyone, expectations
and aspirations are both heterogeneous and difficult to observe.8 Researchers have dealt with
this complication by experimentally manipulating reference points as in Ericson and Fuster (2011)
or Abeler et al. (2011), or inferring reference points from some observables as in Crawford and
Meng (2011). In our study, we take a third approach, eliciting goals directly. Direct elicitation
has the advantage that the reference point is known, but the disadvantage that participants are
8For instance, while Diecidue et al. (2015) found no support for an aspiration level at zero in a study on risky
choice, both their data and those of Zeisberger et al. (2012) suggest heterogeneity in aspiration levels that may mask
the ability to detest a jump at an aspiration level.
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not randomly assigned to the reference point and therefore the inferred relationships may reflect
systematic differences, for instance, between participants who set difficult goals and those who set
easier ones. We address this complication directly in Section 6.
2.3 Multiple Reference Points
A student with a test score of “B+” could compare that result against her typical grade (say,
a “B-”), her expected grade for that test (say, an “A-”), or the performance of her friend (say,
a “B”). Which comparison will drive her evaluation of her performance on the test? In some
cases, one of these reference points may be distinctly more psychologically salient than the others.
But what happens if this is not the case? Much of the existing literature on multiple reference
points has assumed that the reference point is some weighted average of a set of reference points
(e.g., Briesch et al. 1997; Ordo´n˜ez 1998; Winer 1986) or that individuals direct their attention to
only one reference point at a time (Lopes and Oden 1999; March and Shapira 1992). In contrast,
Kahneman (1992) proposed that each of the possible reference points could simultaneously influence
the evaluation of an outcome. In other words, an outcome could produce genuine mixed feelings
or ambivalence, being viewed at once as a gain relative to one reference point and a loss relative to
another (Larsen et al. 2004).
A handful of empirical studies have found support for Kahneman’s simultaneous reference point
account. Ordo´n˜ez et al. (2000) asked participants to rate their satisfaction with a hypothetical
salary offer displayed alongside offers to other qualified job candidates. They documented a pattern
of satisfaction consistent with the two reference points operating separately – lower satisfaction
when the focal salary lay between two peer salaries than when the peers were offered the same
salary as the subject. Sullivan and Kida (1995) found that managers simultaneously compared an
investment’s return to the return of previous investments and to a target return level. Finally, Wang
and Johnson (2012) developed and provided empirical support for a tri-reference point extension
to Prospect Theory that included both the status quo and a goal level as well as a minimum
requirement (see also Weingarten et al. 2016).
Like the examples above, a marathon runner might compare her performance against her time
goal, her most recent marathon time, her personal best marathon time, or a number of other possible
points of comparison. While we hypothesize that comparisons between one’s actual performance
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and time goal will be the primary driver of a runner’s satisfaction, we also test whether comparisons
with previous performance also influence satisfaction.
2.4 Loss Aversion in Predicted and Experienced Utility
“Utility” as most commonly used in economics and decision making research today refers to the
weight given to an outcome as inferred from observed choices. This usage is distinct from Bentham
(1789), who took utility to be the actual affective experience (pain or pleasure) aroused by an
outcome. Kahneman et al. (1997) termed the earlier notion of utility experienced utility and the
later and more common conception decision utility. In our context, there are no decisions so we
refer to predictions of utility as predicted utility. There is significant evidence that experienced and
predicted utility do not necessarily coincide. People often fail to correctly anticipate and predict
their affective reactions to events (Gilbert et al. 1998; Wilson and Gilbert 2003). Furthermore,
the prevailing finding is of an impact bias or systematic overestimation of both the intensity and
duration of emotional reactions (Wilson, Myers, and Gilbert 2003). Of particular relevance for
this study, Kermer et al. (2006) argued that individuals overestimate the hedonic impact of losses,
suggesting that loss aversion is a type of affective forecasting error (see, however, Boyce et al. 2013).
The Prospect Theory value function is explicitly a representation of the predicted utility of
outcomes, rather than the actual hedonic experience of those outcomes (Kahneman 1999). Whether
the characteristics of the value function such as loss aversion also apply to experienced utility
is largely an open question. Studies of choice often implicitly assume an equivalence between
experienced and decision utility, but choice data can only reveal the decision utility of an outcome.
Our study elicits both predicted satisfaction before the marathon and actual satisfaction after the
marathon and thus allows for a test of reference dependence in both predicted and experienced
utility.
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3 Methods
3.1 Participants
We recruited 2,652 participants registered for one of 15 targeted marathons conducted from 2007
to 2009.9 Each marathon was among the 20 largest U.S. marathons, with the number of finishers
ranging from 6,875 for the 2008 Grandma’s Marathon to 38,557 for the 2007 New York Marathon.10
Participants were compensated by being entered into a random drawing for prizes. The Electronic
supplementary material contains a more complete description of the study, including the wording
and order of all survey questions (Section A.1) and summary statistics of the demographic and goal
measures (Section A.2).
We dropped participants from our sample who did not complete the entire study (23.5%), who
did not start (2.3%) or finish (4.6%) the marathon they entered, whose data could not be matched
to official marathon results (2.5%), or who had participated in a previous targeted marathon (0.6%).
These exclusions left us with 1,801 runners. Our sample was reasonably representative of the overall
population of marathon finishers used in our study. We use the 283,651 marathon finishers in our 15
sampled marathons as the “population” and the 1,801 runners described above as our “sample.”11
Our sample (M = 274.99) had slightly faster finishing times than the population of marathoners
(M = 279.41). The mean age of our runner sample, 37.33, was almost identical to the mean age of
runners in the marathon population, 37.27. However, our sample had more women (M = 57.3%)
than the population (M = 40.6%), a pattern consistent with the general finding that women are
more likely to participate in surveys than men (Curtin, Presser, and Singer 2000).
3.2 Conditions
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions created by crossing three pre-marathon
conditions with two post-marathon conditions. Participants in our study were blind to condition
9The marathons surveyed were Boston (2008), Chicago (2007-2009), Grandma’s (2008), Los Angeles (2008),
Marine Corps (2007-2009), New York City (2007), Portland (2007), Rock ‘n’ Roll San Diego (2008), and Twin Cities
(2007-2009).
10http://www.marathonguide.com/Features/Articles/2007RecapOverview.cfm. Referenced on January 18,
2018.
11We created weighted averages by weighting the relevant statistics by the proportion of our sample in each
marathon. For example, 18.4% of our participants ran the 2009 Marine Corps Marathon. To compute the weighted
average finishing time, we multiplied the finishing time for all runners in the 2009 Marine Corps Marathon (281.23
minutes) by 18.4%, repeated this process for the other 14 marathons, and summed the 15 products.
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and were unaware of our specific research hypotheses other than that we were examining the
“relationship between marathon performance and satisfaction.” Although we describe the pre-
and post-marathon conditions in detail, we collapse the conditions in our estimation of the value
function. Results by pre- and post-marathon condition are found in the Electronic supplementary
material, Sections A3.7 and A3.8. All surveys were administered online.
3.2.1 Pre-Marathon Conditions
The pre-marathon conditions consisted of a “goal-not-asked” (n = 746), an early “goal-asked”
(n = 331) and a late “goal-asked” (n = 724) condition. The separate timing conditions were
employed for reasons not related to this paper, and we simplified the design for the 2009 marathons,
dropping the early goal-asked condition.
Participants in the goal-not-asked condition were surveyed approximately two weeks prior to the
marathon and asked to provide some basic demographic information, including their age, gender,
and information on their training and running background. Runners indicated whether they had
previously completed a marathon, and provided their fastest and most recent marathon times, and
their fastest half-marathon and 10-kilometer times. Participants in this condition were not asked
about goals or any other objectives they might have had for their upcoming marathon.
Participants in the early goal-asked condition completed two surveys prior to the marathon,
administered approximately 6 and 2 weeks before the marathon, while participants in the late
goal-asked condition completed only one survey, administered approximately 2 weeks prior to the
marathon. We asked participants in both of the goal-asked conditions to report the same demo-
graphic and experience information as the goal-not-asked participants. In addition, participants in
the goal-asked conditions were asked about time goals and other objectives. Specifically, partici-
pants were asked if they had a “specific time goal for the marathon,” and if so, to indicate it. They
also estimated the likelihood of reaching the goal and were asked to predict their satisfaction on a
1-to-7 scale for finishing 1, 10, and 20 minutes ahead of or behind their time goal and to indicate
on a 1-to-7 scale the importance of meeting their time goal. Participants in the early condition
answered these questions twice, while participants in the late pre-condition answered these ques-
tions once. We included both “goal-asked” and “goal-not-asked” pre-marathon conditions to test
whether providing a goal prior to the marathon increased the commitment to that goal, possibly
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leading to increased loss aversion, as well as to test whether providing a goal prior to the marathon
affected performance (for more details, see Sackett et al. 2015).
3.2.2 Post-Marathon Conditions
The two post-marathon conditions differed only in timing. Participants in the early (n = 1, 183)
condition were contacted 1 day after the completion of their marathon, while participants in the late
(n = 618) condition were contacted 4 weeks after the marathon finished. In both cases, participants
had 2 weeks to complete the survey. We omitted the late post-condition for the 2009 marathons.
We included the two conditions to test whether loss aversion was attenuated over time, as might
be predicted by some accounts of affective forecasting (Gilbert et al. 1998).
Participants were asked if they started the marathon, and if so, whether they completed the
race. Runners who completed the marathon then rated their satisfaction with their performance as
well as effort on a 1-to-7 Likert scale. Participants next rated a number of goals, including meeting
their time goal, on importance on the same scale. Participants then indicated their time goal if
they had one. Note that participants in the goal-asked pre-marathon conditions had previously
provided a goal, while participants in the goal-not-asked condition had not. Critically, to minimize
the possibility that any observed reference-dependent satisfaction was cued by the experimenter,
participants provided their time goal and marathon finishing time after they had completed the
satisfaction question as well as a number of other questions about the importance of several possible
objectives.12
Participants also reported their official time, as well as their bib number. We used these to
match their reported results with their official results.
3.3 Official Performance Data
We matched participant responses with official marathon results obtained from marathon websites.
Large marathons such as the ones in our study typically provide two times, a “chip time” (also
known as “net time”) and a “clock time” (also known as “gun time”). The chip time reflects the
elapsed time between when a runner crosses the start line and the finish line, while the clock time is
12Of course, there is no obvious way to make satisfaction ratings incentive-compatible. Nevertheless, most studies
of well-being use self-reports of happiness and satisfaction (cf. Schwarz and Strack 1999).
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the difference between when a runner finishes the race and when that race officially starts. For large
races like the ones in our sample, the difference between the clock and chip time can be sizable.
Our runners took an average of 7.86 minutes to reach the starting line. We use the official chip
time throughout as a measure of performance, as this is the number that most runners take to be
the most relevant measure of performance (Austen 2001).13
4 Basic Results
In this section, we describe some basic results. In Section 5, we organize these results by estimating
a Prospect Theory value function to relate satisfaction with relative performance.
4.1 Time Goals
For all of the analyses that follow, we use goals that are elicited post-marathon to maximize our
sample size. (In the Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3.6, we report conceptually
similar results using pre-marathon goals for the goal-asked participants.) Overall, 86.1% or 1,550
of our 1,801 participants had time goals. Experienced marathoners (M = 88.2%) were more likely
to have goals than were rookie marathoners (M = 78.8%) (χ2(1) = 23.65, p < .001). 60.7% of
experienced marathoners set goals faster than their best marathon time, with 82.6% setting goals
faster than their last marathon time.
We asked participants to indicate the importance of attaining their time goal on a 1-to-7 scale.
Runners who provided a goal rated that goal as being important on average (M = 5.80), with 86.4%
of runners rating the goal as 5 or higher in importance. Participants were also optimistic about
the chances of reaching their goal, indicating a 72.0% chance of achieving their goal on average.
Participants in the goal-asked conditions provided goals prior to and after the marathon. These
marathoners exhibited a small but statistically significant tendency to report less ambitious goals
after the marathon (M = 246.50) than before it (M = 245.23) (paired t-test, t(835) = 3.30, p <
.001). We provide more details about how goals change in the Electronic supplementary material,
Section A.3.6.
13The chip time is used as a qualifying time for “elite” races such as the Boston Marathon. However, clock time is
the time generally used for determining prize money and other awards.
13
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict our analysis to participants who provided a time goal,
a post-race satisfaction measure, a measure of goal importance, and the number of marathons they
had previously run. These exclusions leave us with 1,534 observations.
4.2 Performance
The average finishing time for our runners was 4:29:70 (male: 4:12:40; female: 4:41:53), with
finishing times ranging from around 2:15 to over 8 hours.14 24.7% of our runners bettered their
time goal, with the success rate varying considerably across marathons, ranging from 3.3% for the
2007 Chicago Marathon to 45.8% for the 2009 Twin Cities Marathon. 35.4% of runners who rated
achieving their time goal as 7 out of 7 in importance met their goal, compared to 18.7% of all
remaining runners (χ2(1) = 52.20, p < 0.001). In addition, 23.4% of experienced (i.e., non-rookie)
marathoners beat their time goal, compared to 28.5% of first-time marathoners (χ2(1) = 3.90,
p = .098).
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Figure 1: Histograms of finishing time relative to time goal. The left panel plots relative perfor-
mance in minutes with 5 minute bins. The right panel plots normalized relative performance in %
with 2% bins.
We define “relative performance” to be the difference between finishing time and time goal.
Runners fell short of their goal by 18.27 minutes on average (Median: 11.84). To deal with the
large variation of finishing times, we also created a “normalized relative performance” measure by
14Precise finishing times are not provided to protect the anonymity of our participants.
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dividing relative performance by time goal. For example, a runner who ran 4:12 and had a goal of
running 4:00 was 5% (12/240) short of her goal. The mean normalized relative performance was
6.1% short of the goal (Median: 4.7%). Figure 1 shows histograms of both measures of relative
performance.
4.3 Predicted Satisfaction
We asked participants in the goal-asked conditions to predict their satisfaction from finishing 1, 10,
and 20 minutes ahead or behind their goal. The 20 minute questions were added for the 2008 and
2009 surveys. Thus, this analysis only uses 2008 and 2009 participants in the goal-asked conditions
(n = 613). The average of these predictions is shown in Figure 2, where positive values along the
x-axis indicate performance that betters the goal.
Note that this figure traces the characteristic shape of the Prospect Theory value function.
Because the satisfaction scale is ordinal, we analyze these results with ordered logistic regression,
predicting expected satisfaction S(t) based on performance relative to the goal, t. Our model
includes dummy variables for finishing t minutes ahead of the goal, I+t, t = 1, 10, 20, and t minutes
behind the goal, I−t, t = 1, 10, 20, as well as fixed effects for each of the participants:
S(t) = n−20I−20 + n−10I−10 + n−1I−1 + p+1I+1 + p+10I+10 + p+20I+20.
15
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Figure 2: Predicted satisfaction as a function of relative performance.
This model reveals statistically significant levels of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.
Although there are multiple ways to define and measure loss aversion (see Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt,
and Paraschiv 2007), in our context, the most natural definition compares the effect on satisfaction
of improving from 20 minutes short of the goal to 1 minute short of the goal, n−1−n−20, to the effect
on satisfaction of exceeding the goal by 20 minutes rather than 1 minute, p+20 − p+1. A Wald test
shows that a decrease in losses increases satisfaction more than an increase in gains, χ2(1) = 11.50,
p < .001. We test for diminishing sensitivity in losses by testing whether .9(n−10 − n−20) =
n−1−n−10 (χ2(1) = 13.68, p < .001) and in gains by testing whether .9(p+20− p+10) = p+10− p+1
(χ2(1) = 26.02, p < .001).15
4.4 Actual Satisfaction
Mean satisfaction with performance was 4.84 out of 7. Satisfaction was negatively correlated
with finishing time, with faster finishers more satisfied than slower finishers (Spearman ρ = -0.24,
15Although a comparison of n−10−n−20 to p+20−p+10 reveals significant loss aversion (χ2(1) = 14.83, p < .001), a
comparison of n−1 − n−10 to p+10 − p+1 does not (χ2(1) = 0.57, p = .45). In the Electronic supplementary material,
Section A.3.10, we present two alternative analyses: a parametric analysis using paired t-tests and an ordered logit
analysis using piecewise polynomials, as in Section 5.2.
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p < .001). However, the correlation was much stronger if we considered performance relative to
a runner’s time goal, either relative performance in minutes (Spearman ρ = −0.59, p < .001) or
normalized relative performance in percentage terms (Spearman ρ = −0.60, p < .001).
5 Estimation of the Value Function
In this section, we test whether the relationship between satisfaction and performance exhibits
reference dependence. There are several challenges to uncovering such a relationship (Frey and
Stutzer 2002). First, each participant provided only one satisfaction rating, and thus we must
estimate an aggregate value function. Second, our satisfaction measure was elicited on a 1-to-7
Likert scale. Although such a measure is often interpreted as being a cardinal measure, it should be
thought of as an ordinal scale (cf. Long and Freese 2014). Third, the discreteness and boundedness
of this scale violates the standard regression assumption of normally distributed errors, making
OLS or even nonlinear regression inappropriate. Finally, there is the challenge of measuring loss
aversion. Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) discuss the issues in defining loss aversion, in particular
in cases in which the value functions for gains and losses do not have the same shape.
To deal with the first challenge, we assume that satisfaction is a function of normalized relative
performance, the difference between the time goal and the finishing time divided by the time goal.
This normalization makes performance across participants more readily comparable and appropriate
for aggregation. We deal with the second and third challenge by employing ordered logit regression,
which does not assume equal spacing between the categories of the response variable. Although an
ordered logit analysis is statistically appropriate for our setting, the interpretation of coefficients
is more complicated than in standard value function estimation exercises. Ordered logit regression
models the relationship of some predictor variables (in our case, relative performance, as well as
some control variables) and some latent variable (in our case, satisfaction), and then relates values
of that latent variable to some ordinal scale (in our case, a 1-to-7 Likert rating). The regression
coefficient of a predictor variable therefore does not provide an estimate of the direct effect on
our measure of satisfaction, but instead indicates the effect of that predictor variable on the log
odds of one satisfaction level relative to all inferior satisfaction levels. Accordingly, we perform
inference and present the fitted model parameters on the scale of the linear predictors, but plot the
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relationship both on the scale of the linear predictors as well as in the form of expected satisfaction
on the original ordinal scale. Even though the latter plot violates the ordinal properties of the
satisfaction scale, we provide this plot for heuristic purposes and because the scale is more readily
interpretable (Harrell 2010).16 Finally, as discussed in Section 2.1, we examine loss aversion by
considering two measures: (i) a jump in satisfaction from reaching a goal; and (ii) the difference in
slopes in the gain and loss domains away from 0.
We adopt multiple approaches to test for the main properties of reference dependence, loss
aversion and diminishing sensitivity. We first fit a smoothing spline to the data to provide a
general sense of the shape of the underlying relationship. Although a smoothing spline is useful
for exploratory data analysis, it is not amenable to statistical inference. We therefore also fit the
data with piecewise polynomials. We use these piecewise functions to provide a statistical test of
whether satisfaction with performance exhibits reference dependence, looking for a jump in the
value function, a difference in the gain and loss slopes away from 0, and diminishing sensitivity.17
The two approaches, the smoothing spline and the piecewise polynomials, offer a consistent picture
of reference-dependent preferences.
5.1 Smoothing Spline
We first provide a general sense of the relationship between relative performance and satisfaction
by fitting a smoothing spline to the raw data (see Figure 3). While smoothing splines are not easily
amenable to inference (because n data points are modeled by n − 1 separate polynomials), they
can provide insight into the shape of the underlying function without making any strong a priori
assumptions about that shape (Green and Silverman 1994). Our smoothing spline is constructed
from separate cubic polynomials between each data point.18
Smoothing splines impose continuity constraints on the first and second derivatives and thus
16For any combination of predictors, the ordered logit model produces a probability distribution for each of the 7
satisfaction levels. We can thus plot expected satisfaction for any level of relative performance. When we employ
control variables such as dummy variables for a specific marathon, the control variables are set at their mean levels.
17The power function is the most commonly-used parametric form for estimating the Prospect Theory value function
(e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Wu and Gonzalez 1996). It has a single parameter governing curvature and a single
parameter indexing loss aversion when the power parameter for gains and losses coincides. However, parametric
forms such as the power function cannot be readily incorporated within ordered logit models.
18The smoothing spline has a single parameter, which determines the tradeoff between the curve’s smoothness
and its closeness to the data. This parameter can be chosen subjectively or determined analytically by leave-one-out
cross-validation, the approach taken here. Additional discussion of smoothing splines is found in Green and Silverman
(1994) and Wang (2011).
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are unable to capture the discontinuities at the reference point that are characteristic of reference-
dependent preferences. Accordingly, the right panel of Figure 3 consists of two smoothing splines,
fit separately for observations below and above the reference point. Both panels reflect Prospect
Theory’s characteristic S-shape, with the right panel also capturing both aspects of loss aversion
discussed in Section 2.1, a discontinuity or “jump” at the reference point as well as a function that
is steeper for losses than gains.
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Figure 3: Raw data and a smoothing spline fit to the full domain of performance (left panel) and
raw data and two smoothing splines, one fit below and the other above zero (right panel).
5.2 Piecewise Polynomial Regression Models
We next fit piecewise polynomial models using ordered logit regression to relate satisfaction with
normalized relative performance. These models consist of two functions fit separately for negative
and positive relative performance and allowing for a discontinuity at the reference point:
S(x) =

∑a
i=1 nix
i, x < 0
∑a
i=1 pix
i + J, x ≥ 0
.
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The parameter a captures the order of the polynomials. We fit linear (a = 1), quadratic
(a = 2), and cubic (a = 3) polynomials, including controls for each of our 15 marathons, as well as
the gender of the participant. The quadratic model is favored by both the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) (linear: 4903; quadratic: 4864; cubic: 4868) and bootstrap validation.19 For
these reasons as well as for parsimony, we use the quadratic model for our main analyses. The
Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3.1, shows that our main results described below
hold for polynomials besides the quadratic, while Section A.3.2 provides validation for splitting the
piecewise polynomials at 0, our presumed reference point.
Parameter estimates for the piecewise quadratic polynomial are presented in Table 1. Ordered
logit parameters are on a log odds scale, and thus are commonly interpreted in terms of odds ratios,
which for a parameter estimate βˆk equals exp(βˆk). A one unit increase in k changes the odds of a
higher response (for instance, a 7 versus a 1 through 6) by a factor of exp(βˆk), holding all other
variables constant. For example, a 1% increase in performance from 0% to 1% increases the odds
of reporting higher satisfaction by a factor of exp(pˆ1(.01) + pˆ2(.01)
2) = 1.26.20 The left panel of
Figure 4 plots the linear predictors from the quadratic model on a log odds scale, while the right
panel plots expected satisfaction on the original ordinal scale.
19Our bootstrap validation involves drawing a bootstrap sample with replacement from the original sample, then
fitting the model to be validated to the bootstrap sample. That fitted model was then applied to the original sample,
and Somers’ d, a measure of the association between predicted probabilities and observed responses, was compared
against that obtained by fitting the model directly to the original sample. This provided an estimate of the bias due
to overfitting, also called the model’s “optimism.” This process was repeated 1000 times, and the average optimism
was subtracted from the index of accuracy from the original sample, producing an overfitting-corrected estimate
(Harrell 2010).
20In the proportional odds model, the inference is independent of the reference category, i.e., the effect of an increase
in variable k on the log odds of Pr(Y ≥ j) is the same for any level of the response variable, j.
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Predictor βˆ
Linear terms
losses (nˆ1) 18.06***
gains (pˆ1) 24.57***
Quadratic terms
losses (nˆ2) 19.53***
gains (pˆ2) −181.62***
jump (Jˆ) 0.97***
Observations 1534
degrees of freedom 20
-2 log likelihood 4673.04
Table 1: Ordered logit regression on piecewise polynomials relating satisfaction to normalized
relative performance. The statistical significance of coefficients is indicated by: *** (p < .01), **
(p < .05), and * (p < .10).
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Figure 4: Ordered logit regression on piecewise quadratic polynomial relating satisfaction to normal-
ized relative performance. The left panel plots the log odds of meeting or exceeding the midpoint of
our satisfaction scale (4), along with a 95% confidence band, while the right panel presents expected
satisfaction on the original ordinal (1-7) scale.
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5.2.1 Test of reference dependence
Loss aversion
In Section 2.1, we distinguished between loss aversion at the reference point (a jump), and loss
aversion away from the reference point (a difference in slopes). We begin by considering loss
aversion at the reference point. The jump at the reference point is significant and positive, χ2(1) =
24.89, p < .001. Just meeting one’s goal more than doubles the odds of reporting higher satisfaction,
exp(0.97) = 2.63.
We next consider loss aversion away from the reference point. Loss aversion is commonly
measured as the ratio of the loss and gain slopes or loss and gain levels. When the value function
is determined from certainty equivalents for gambles, these ratios have a cardinal interpretation,
inspiring the common observation that “losses are about twice as painful as gains are pleasurable”
(Hastie and Dawes 2001, p. 216). Because the ordered logit model maps the observed categories
onto a continuous latent variable, effects of that variable can only be interpreted ordinally. Ordered
logit coefficients reflect the log odds of reporting satisfaction greater than or equal to any given
level, therefore even the ratio nˆ1/pˆ1 in the piecewise linear model (a = 1) has no straightforward
interpretation and thus is not a natural measure of loss aversion. As a result, we do not provide
measures of loss aversion but instead test whether there is a statistically significant difference
between the loss and gain slopes. A second complication with polynomial functions is that the loss
and gain slopes vary with the distance x from the reference point. We deal with this complication
by comparing the gain and loss slopes for different distances x from the reference point, S′(x) and
S′(−x), ranging from 0.5% to 5%. We choose this cutoff because only 3.2% of our data for gains
exceeds 5%. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 for the best fitting quadratic
model.
As we move away from the reference point, the slopes in both the loss and gain domains get
smaller (see the section on diminishing sensitivity below), but they do so at different rates. The
slope for losses exceeds the slope for gains for x ≥ 2.1% and becomes significantly steeper than the
slope for gains (at the 0.05 level) for x ≥ 4.6%. There are conceptual, statistical, and measurement
reasons that we find modest amounts of loss aversion on this measure, contrary to Booij and van
de Kuilen (2009) and others. First, while a conceptual distinction can be made between the jump
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at the reference point and the difference in slopes in the gain and loss domains, they are difficult
to disentangle statistically. This is especially difficult with higher order polynomials, for which
a steeply curved loss domain can subsume the discontinuity at the reference point. Indeed, we
observe a more steeply sloped function in the loss domain for the higher ordered models, coupled
with smaller estimates for the size of the jump at the reference point. For example, for a cubic
model, the loss slope is significantly greater than the gain slope for x ≥ 3.7% and the region in
which loss aversion in slopes is significant grows as the order of the polynomial in losses increases
(see Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3.1). Second, the confidence intervals for small
losses or small gains are wider than for more intermediate losses or gains (see Figure 4), reflecting
the general tendency for confidence intervals to be narrowest at intermediate levels (e.g., Draper
and Smith 1966). Finally, our relative performance measure reflects measurement error because
of a linguistic ambiguity in how goals are communicated. We asked our participants to provide a
time goal. A runner with a goal to finish the marathon in g minutes can express the goal as g
or g − 1 (1 second faster than g). For example, Allen et al. (2017) documented the tendency of
marathon finishing times to bunch just below round numbers such as 4 hours. In our sample, 179
of our participants provided a goal of 4:00:00, 58 participants a goal of 3:59:59, and 13 participants
a goal of 3:59:00. We suspect that most of the latter participants were communicating that their
goal was to run in “3:59 something.” Indeed, only one runner provided a goal of 3:58:00.
Finally, we compare the gain and loss levels, S(0)−S(−x) and S(x)−S(0), at different distances
x from the reference point. This comparison incorporates the jump at the reference point and the
difference in slopes away from the reference point. Loss levels are significantly greater than gain
levels for all values of x from 0% to 5%.
Diminishing sensitivity
Diminishing sensitivity away from the reference point is equivalent to n2 > 0 for losses and p2 < 0
for gains. We find strong support for diminishing sensitivity in both domains, losses, χ2(1) = 45.57,
p < .001, and gains, χ2(1) = 9.38, p = .002.
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Slopes Levels
x loss gain p-value loss gain p-value
0.0% 18.06 24.57 0.414 0.97 0.00 0.000
0.5% 17.87 22.76 0.512 1.06 0.12 0.000
1.0% 17.67 20.94 0.639 1.15 0.23 0.000
1.5% 17.48 19.12 0.800 1.23 0.33 0.001
2.0% 17.28 17.31 0.997 1.32 0.42 0.002
2.5% 17.09 15.49 0.776 1.41 0.50 0.005
3.0% 16.89 13.68 0.536 1.49 0.57 0.008
3.5% 16.70 11.86 0.318 1.57 0.64 0.011
4.0% 16.50 10.04 0.154 1.66 0.69 0.013
4.5% 16.31 8.23 0.059 1.74 0.74 0.014
5.0% 16.11 6.41 0.018 1.82 0.77 0.013
Table 2: Tests of loss aversion in the relationship between satisfaction and normalized relative
performance. The table presents loss and gain slopes (S′(−x) and S′(x)) and loss and gain levels
(S(0)− S(−x) and S(x)− S(0)) at different values of x for the quadratic model. The p-values
are obtained by Wald tests that examine the null hypothesis of equality of the loss and gain slopes
and the loss and gain levels, respectively.
5.2.2 Robustness Analysis
We report robustness analyses in the Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3. We show
there that the main results on loss aversion of levels and diminishing sensitivity are largely robust to
the choice of order of loss and gain polynomials (A.3.1), the use of relative performance in minutes
instead of normalized relative performance as a measure of performance (A.3.3), and the exclusion
of “influential” outliers (A.3.4).
5.2.3 Alternative reference points
We have assumed so far that goals serve as reference points. However, it is possible that other
comparisons that are correlated with goals are really driving the relationship between performance
and satisfaction. Therefore, we contrast our goals-as-reference-points model with two alternative
models: one in which performance is defined relative to a runner’s best marathon time and one in
which performance is defined relative to a runner’s most recent marathon time. Not surprisingly,
these two measures are highly correlated with performance relative to time goal (Best Marathon:
r = 0.42; Last Marathon: r = 0.39). Because the latter two reference points are only applicable
to runners with previous marathon experience, we restricted this analysis to experienced runners
who reported both a best and most recent marathon time (n = 1, 015). The regression coefficients
for these analyses are presented in Table 3.
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Although all three models have similar shapes, the model with time goal as a reference point is
clearly the best fitting model as measured by log likelihood. Correspondingly, the coefficients for
the best and last marathon time models are considerably smaller than for the model that uses time
goal as a reference point. For example, bettering a goal by 1% instead of 0% increases the odds of
reporting higher satisfaction by a factor of 1.37. The same factors for best and last marathon are
1.04 and 1.05, respectively. Critically, bettering one’s best or last marathon produces a significant
jump in satisfaction (Best: χ2(1) = 14.59, p < .001; Last: χ2(1) = 13.10, p < .001). However,
neither model exhibits a significant difference in slopes between the gain and loss domains, either
at the reference point or at x = 5%, or diminishing sensitivity in either gains or losses.
Reference Point
Predictor Time Goal Best Time Last Time
Linear
losses (nˆ1) 19.61*** 2.65*** 2.81*
gains (pˆ1) 35.11** 3.84 4.99**
Quadratic
losses (nˆ2) 21.18*** 1.67 4.24
gains (pˆ2) −329.79 −9.16 −6.83
Jump (Jˆ) 0.77*** 0.82*** 0.77***
Observations 1015 1015 1015
degrees of freedom 20 20 20
-2 log likelihood 3102.18 3423.30 3406.08
Table 3: Alternative reference point analysis. Ordered logit regression on quadratic polynomial
relating satisfaction to normalized relative performance, defined relative to three alternative ref-
erence points: a runner’s time goal, their best previous marathon time, and their most recent
previous marathon time. The statistical significance of coefficients is indicated by: *** (p < .01),
** (p < .05), and * (p < .10).
5.3 Multiple Reference Points
The previous analysis suggests that comparisons between performance and time goal drive satis-
faction to a greater degree than do comparisons between performance and past marathon times.
Nevertheless, this analysis does not preclude the possibility that the latter comparisons additionally
influence their satisfaction as in Kahneman’s (1992) multiple reference point account. Therefore
we test whether incorporating multiple reference points in the model contributes to its explanatory
power. Let xg and xb be a runner’s finishing time relative to their time goal and their best marathon
time, respectively. We estimate a multiple reference point model that is the sum of satisfaction
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relative to the time goal,
Sg(xg) =
 n1gxg + n2gx
2
g , xg < 0
p1gxg + p2gx
2
g + Jg, xg ≥ 0
,
and satisfaction relative to best marathon time,
Sb(xb) =
 n1bxb + n2bx
2
b , xb < 0
p1bxb + p2bx
2
b + Jb, xb ≥ 0
.
Table 4 shows the estimates of this model, and Figure 5 displays the separate marginal effects
of performance relative to the time goal and relative to best marathon time, generated by holding
performance relative to the other reference point at zero. Although the multiple reference point
model provides a significantly better fit than the model incorporating only the time goal as a
reference point (likelihood ratio test, χ2(5) = 219.14, p < .001), this comparison mostly impacts
overall satisfaction by producing an additional jump in satisfaction when performance exceeds a
runner’s best marathon time, χ2(1) = 13.19, p < .001. Thus, we find evidence that time goal
and best marathon time simultaneously act as reference points in shaping satisfaction. We find
nearly identical results if we use last marathon time in place of best marathon time (see Electronic
supplementary material, Section A.3.5).
Predictor Time Goal Best Time
Linear
losses (nˆ1g) 18.59*** (nˆ1b) −1.64*
gains (pˆ1g) 34.09** (pˆ1b) 1.02
Quadratic
losses (nˆ2g) 19.06*** (nˆ2b) −1.30
gains (pˆ2g) −306.83 (pˆ2b) −1.95
Jump (Jˆg) 0.74*** (Jˆb) 0.80***
Observations 1015
degrees of freedom 25
-2 log likelihood 3071.98
Table 4: Multiple reference point analysis. Ordered logit regression on quadratic polynomial re-
lating satisfaction to normalized relative performance, defined relative to both time goal and a
runner’s best previous marathon time. The statistical significance of coefficients is indicated by:
*** (p < .01), ** (p < .05), and * (p < .10).
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of normalized performance relative to time goal (solid), and relative
to best marathon time (dashed), on satisfaction. The left panel plots the log odds of meeting
or exceeding the midpoint of our satisfaction scale (4), while the right panel presents expected
satisfaction on the original ordinal (1-7) scale. For each marginal effect plot, performance relative
to the other reference point was held at zero.
6 Alternative Explanations
We have suggested that our results provide evidence that goals act as reference points and therefore
that satisfaction exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity relative to the time goal reference
point. In this section, we consider three alternative explanations for our finding.
6.1 Is this pattern driven by participants changing their goal?
All of our analyses have used post-marathon goal measures to determine whether a participant
exceeds or surpasses a goal. As a result, it is possible that our pattern of results is driven by a
group of individuals who view achieving the goal as sufficiently important that they modify their
goal after the race to appear as if they achieved their goal. In addition, 39.0% of runners who fell
short of their pre-marathon goal increased their reported goal following the marathon, compared
to 6.0% of the runners who bested their pre-marathon goal (χ2(1, 836) = 25.44, p < .001). Of
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course, such a shift could occur for non-psychological reasons (such as an unfavorable change in the
weather or an injury onset) or for psychological reasons (such as the desire to self-enhance).
To test for the possibility that changes in goals is driving the pattern in Figure 4, we examined
all participants in the goal-asked condition who provided goals prior to and after the marathon
(n = 835) and fit a piecewise quadratic polynomial to normalized relative performance defined by
their pre-marathon goal as well as their post-marathon goal. The results of this analysis show a
significant jump when we use pre-marathon goals (Jˆ = 1.13, p < .001), as well as post-marathon
goal (Jˆ = 1.08, p < .001), suggesting that our main results are not driven by shifts in goals. Details
of this analysis are found in the Electronic supplementary material, Section A.3.6.
6.2 Boston Marathon qualifying
We have interpreted the discontinuity in satisfaction at a time goal as being psychological in na-
ture. However, the pattern could reflect extrinsic benefits, most notably qualifying for the Boston
Marathon. The Boston Marathon is America’s oldest marathon and requires that the bulk of its
participants qualify for the race by meeting a standard that differs for age and gender. To examine
whether our effect is driven by this extrinsic benefit, we include a dummy variable that captures
whether a participant’s time goal is within one minute on either side of the Boston Marathon qual-
ifying time for their gender and age group (n = 150). We then repeat our analysis by including the
Boston Marathon qualifying dummy variable as well as a term that interacts our jump parameter
with the Boston Marathon qualifying dummy variable. The jump remains positive and significant
(Jˆ = 0.92, p < .001), suggesting that our pattern of satisfaction is not driven by the extrinsic
benefit of qualifying for the Boston Marathon.
6.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Because we did not randomly assign goals to marathon participants, it is possible that marathoners
who surpass their goals differ from runners who fall short of their goals in respects other than their
performance. A similar critique applies to Boyce et al. (2013). In other words, a value function
that appears to exhibit reference dependence might capture a mixture of agents, none of whom
exhibit the characteristic Prospect Theory value function. To illustrate, we sketch a two-type model
and show how this model could produce a pattern that resembles Figure 4 (with the exception of
28
diminishing sensitivity).
Suppose that there are two types of runners, “ambitious” (denoted Θ = A) and “unambitious”
(denoted Θ = U). Ambitious runners set aggressive goals and achieve these goals very infrequently.
Unambitious runners establish modest goals and mostly achieve these goals. If satisfaction for
ambitious runners is linear and monotonically increasing in performance relative to the goal, and
satisfaction for unambitious runners is flat and high (above 6 on the 1-to-7 Likert scale), a mixture
of these two types could easily produce what appears to be loss aversion and/or a jump in aggregate,
even though both types have a linear satisfaction function.
We examine whether our data are consistent with this two-type model by exploiting a natural
experiment in our data. Our data sample includes 15 marathons over 3 years. These marathons
differ considerably in the overall rate in which marathoners in our sample achieve their goals.
Only 4.0% of Chicago Marathon runners in 2007 met their goal, compared to 45.0% of runners in
the 2009 Chicago Marathon. Not surprisingly, the rates of goal attainment are driven mostly by
weather. The high temperature for the Chicago Marathon in 2007 was 93 degrees, while the high
temperature in 2009 was 43 degrees (see Electronic supplementary material, Table A.6). Across
marathons, the correlation between the rate of goal attainment and the day’s high temperature is
r = -.78.
If the two-type model holds and the exogenous shock of weather does not influence the propor-
tion of types Θ = A and Θ = U , only the likelihood that ambitious runners achieve their goals,
then we should see more loss aversion and larger jumps for low success rate marathons and less
loss aversion and smaller jumps for high success rate marathons. To test this implication, we refit
our quadratic model and include the high temperature for each marathon and a term that inter-
acts high temperature and whether a participant met their time goal. We also include gender but
omit dummy variables for each marathon, because variation across marathons is captured by the
weather variable. Critically and contrary to the two-type model, the interaction term is not signif-
icant (χ2(1) = 0.35, p = 0.552), and when the interaction term is included, the jump is significant
even for the 2007 Chicago Marathon (Jˆ = .79, p = .031). We obtain nearly identical results using
low and average temperatures for each marathon.
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7 Discussion
Investigations of reference-dependent preferences have typically involved two domains: risky de-
cision making and the endowment effect. While these domains differ in critical ways, they share
important commonalities – traditionally, both are investigations of decision making around a status
quo reference point, either current wealth level or state of ownership of a good.
Although taking the status quo as a reference point is sensible in these studies, for many deci-
sions, other standards may be more relevant (e.g., Barberis 2013; Baucells et al. 2011). In addition,
the use of choice and pricing as dependent measures generates insights about decision utility but is
typically agnostic about the welfare implications of those decisions. Our study examines a domain
distinct from most prior studies. We study how goals influence satisfaction, and thus our investiga-
tion departs from most research on reference dependence both in using a non-status quo reference
point and in enlisting satisfaction as a dependent measure. Specifically, we show that satisfac-
tion with performance for marathon runners is reference-dependent, with satisfaction exhibiting a
jump at the reference point as well as classical loss aversion, an asymmetry in the steepness of loss
and gain slopes. In addition, satisfaction is influenced by multiple reference points – although a
marathoner’s time goal is the primary reference point, best and last marathon times serve as sec-
ondary benchmarks. While earlier studies have also found evidence that multiple reference points
can operate simultaneously (Ordo´n˜ez et al. 2000), our study does so in a naturalistic manner with-
out specifically drawing a participant’s attention to possible alternative reference points. Finally,
by documenting loss aversion in both predicted and experienced utility, we show that loss aversion
is not a forecasting error.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our research for three broad questions about
reference points. First, what is the relationship between decision utility, predicted utility, and ex-
perienced utility? Second, does a jump in utility at the reference point generalize beyond marathon
runners and satisfaction? Third, what psychological processes govern the formation and adaptation
of reference points?
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7.1 Decision Utility, Predicted Utility, and Experienced Utility
Prospect theory and other models of reference-dependent utility (e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006,
2007) are traditionally regarded as accounts of decision utility, i.e., specifications of how proba-
bilities and outcomes are evaluated and combined to explain and predict decisions. Kahneman,
Wakker, and Sarin (1997) contrast decision utility with two other notions of utility: experienced
utility, the hedonic experience associated with an outcome, and predicted utility, an individual’s
forecast of her experienced utility. A correspondence between these three types of utility is often
implicitly assumed because “choices provide all necessary information about the utility of outcomes
because rational agents who wish to do so will optimize their hedonic experience” (Kahneman et
al. 1997, p. 375).
Studies have documented a deviation between decision and experienced utility (e.g., Scitovsky
1976; Kahneman, Frederickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier 1993) and between predicted and expe-
rienced utility (e.g., Kahneman and Snell 1990; Loewenstein and Adler 1995). However, most of
these studies have not investigated the relationship between decision, predicted, and experienced
utility in settings involving reference points. One exception is Kermer et al. (2006), who found loss
aversion in predicted utility but not in experienced utility. These results led the authors to conclude
in the title of their paper that “loss aversion is an affective forecasting error.” Some recent studies,
however, have cast doubt on this conclusion by documenting loss aversion in experienced utility. In
a large-scale study involving 49,393 individuals from Germany and the United Kingdom, Boyce et
al. (2013) found that a loss of income had a more substantial effect on subjective well-being than
an equivalent income gain. Ockenfels, Sliwka, and Werner (2015) documented a similar pattern in
a study of German personnel data, demonstrating loss aversion in job satisfaction for deviations
around a fair bonus payment. Finally, Carter and McBride (2013) fit satisfaction scores elicited
from an experimental “Matching Pennies” game and uncovered an S-shaped satisfaction with loss
aversion for large (but not small) losses.
Our study provides some additional insights into the important question of how decision, pre-
dicted, and experienced utility are related in settings involving possible gains and losses relative to
a reference point. We find loss aversion in both predicted utility (Figure 2) and experienced utility
(Figure 4). It is important to note that our findings merely document a qualitative correspondence
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between predicted and experienced utility when goals serve as a reference point. We do not make
any quantitative claims on whether the in the degree of loss aversion differs for prediction relative
to experience. Measurement of loss aversion is undoubtedly highly sensitive to the salience of the
reference point. Therefore, methods for eliciting predicted versus experienced satisfaction may very
well not be psychologically neutral in drawing attention to a reference point. As a result, we refrain
from making statements about whether there is more or less loss aversion in predicted or actual
satisfaction, merely noting that both types of judgments exhibit loss aversion. In addition, because
our study only examines aggregate patterns of satisfaction, it is silent about the correspondence
between predicted and experienced utility at the individual level.21
Although our study does not speak directly to decision utility when goals serve as reference
points, Allen, Dechow, Pope, and Wu (2017) document a pattern of marathon finishing times
consistent with a value function with a jump, classical loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity.
They find significant bunching near round-number finishing times, such as 3:00 or 3:30. For example,
50.0% more runners complete a marathon in 2:59:xx than in 3:00:xx. The archival data analyzed
in Allen et al. and the survey data presented in this paper collectively indicate that utility, whether
that utility is decision, predicted, or experienced, exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity
when goals serve as reference points.
Of course, this paper leaves unanswered the more general question of the relationship between
decision, predicted, and experienced utility for settings with non-goal reference points. The question
of whether goals operate differently from other reference points, status quo or otherwise, is beyond
the scope of this study. We hope that our study serves as an inspiration and possible template for
important investigations of this sort.
7.2 Jumps at the Reference Point
The discontinuity or jump in satisfaction at the goal documented in this investigation raises the
natural question of whether our observed pattern of experienced utility extends to a gambling
21Both of these questions, while important, pose empirical challenges. For example, focalism might produce
differences in prediction and experience (Wilson et al. 2000). In prediction, marathon runners could focus on how
falling short or exceeding a goal influences their satisfaction and ignore other factors (such as the weather, injuries,
etc.) that also likely affect satisfaction. Focalism, therefore, could result in differences in loss aversion, as predicted
by Kermer et al. (2006) or merely a more compressed relationship between satisfaction and relative performance in
experience. In addition, asking a participant for multiple predictions of satisfaction might highlight the difference
between gains and losses (e.g., McGraw et al. 2010).
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context or other settings in which Prospect Theory has been evoked. On the one hand, there are
psychological reasons that our marathon setting may differ from investigations of risky choice such
as Abdellaoui et al. (2007). The qualitative difference between barely surpassing and just falling
short of a performance goal may be different because goal pursuit is in large part driven by the
desire to achieve success and avoid failure (e.g., Atkinson 1957). The notion that goals may produce
a more dichotomous categorization of outcomes than other types of reference points suggests that
the value function around a goal may have a distinct shape.
There are other reasons, however, to surmise that a jump at the reference point is not restricted
to goal pursuit. Studies of risky decision making have documented patterns consistent with a
discontinuous value function. Schneider and Lopes (1986) found risk-seeking in losses involving a
chance at breaking even, but no risk-seeking when loss gambles were displaced from zero, a pattern
consistent with a value function that is linear in losses with a jump at the reference point of 0.
In addition, Payne (2005) and, to a lesser extent, Diecidue, Levy, and van de Ven (2015), provide
some evidence in risky choice for a jump at 0.
One possible reason for the limited evidence for jumps at the reference point is that statistical
identification of a jump is difficult, even though loss aversion can be decomposed conceptually
into loss aversion at and away from the reference point. In our analyses, although the jump at
the reference point is robust to various model specifications, we do observe a tradeoff between
the size of the jump and the magnitude of the slope in the loss domain. In addition, parametric
models may be unable to distinguish between a continuous value function that is very steep near
the reference point and a discontinuous model with a jump at the reference point. Identification
requires specially-designed stimuli with a relatively dense set of outcomes located near the reference
point. Interestingly, reference-dependent preferences in decision utility generate a bunching of
finishing times around a goal (e.g., Allen et al. 2017). In turn, identification of reference-dependent
experienced utility in this study is facilitated by the saturation of relative performance around 0.
Although we find evidence for a jump in satisfaction at the reference point, we suspect that
the value function around a goal might not be well-behaved. As an analogy, recall that Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) originally proposed a probability weighting function that was discontinuous
at 0 and 1. Kahneman and Tversky suggested that “highly unlikely events are either ignored
or overweighted...Consequently, pi is not well-defined near the end-points.” (p. 283). A similar
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psychology may apply to performance near a goal. Falling a bit short of a goal will sometimes
be rounded up and coded as a “success.” In other cases, the same outcome will be viewed as
“falling short” and hence be seen as a substantial setback. The implication then is poorly-specified
behavior around a reference point, with some losses assimilated to the reference point and other
losses standing out as disappointing.
7.3 Reference Point Formation
Earlier, we discussed some of the challenges with identifying the appropriate reference point for a
particular application. In investigations of asset pricing, for example, the reference point may be
the purchase price, the current price, the historical high price, or some value determined by an
investor’s expectations. The difficulty in adjudicating between a set of plausible reference points
reflects in part an impoverished understanding of what psychological processes drive reference
point formation and adaptation (for some exceptions, see Arkes et al. 2008, Baillon et al. 2017, and
Baucells et al. 2011). While a general account of reference-point formation is lacking, we propose
that motivational processes can be implicated in the selection of reference points for achievement-
oriented activities. This study and Allen et al.’s (2017) related work provide insight into how goals
operate once they have been formed. Marathoners often choose round number goals (49.1% of our
sample chose a half-hour or hour-goal). Goals, whether or not a round number, serve as reference
points, influencing decision utility through allocation of effort in training and on race day, as well
as experienced utility, how marathoners judge their performance.
Our study is, however, silent about how goals are determined or how they might change over
time. Decision makers who self-set goals face a dilemma. Although higher goals generally lead
to higher performance (Locke and Latham 2006), those who perform better, paradoxically, often
feel worse because their performance falls below those lofty goals (Mento et al. 1992), a direct
implication of a “goals as reference points” account. Goal formation processes therefore must
balance the self-regulatory value of difficult goals with a desire to avoid disappointment with one’s
performance. Recent theoretical models in economics such as Hsiaw (2013) have tried to resolve
this paradox by studying goals within a dual self framework. In addition, some recent empirical
work by Clark et al. (2017) and Corgnet et al. (2015) provides some fresh data on the relationship
between goal selection, monetary rewards, and performance.
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We hope that a better understanding of the relationship between goals and satisfaction, as put
forth in this paper, provides a starting point for determining how goals are formed and updated
over time. In other settings, reference points might be determined by other psychological processes,
including basic cognitive processes such as attention, memory, or categorization, as well as hedonic
and motivational considerations. If the results shown here are general, both decision making and
satisfaction will be governed by a calculus in which outcomes that fall short of or exceed the
reference point, however determined, are viewed as qualitatively different.
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